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I. INTRODUCTION
Nike may be able to “Just Do It” in California, but it can’t “Just
1
Say It” anymore. After Nike v. Kasky, statements made by a business
2
enterprise are deemed to be commercial speech if they reach any
potential consumer within the state of California.
Such
commercial speech is accorded less First Amendment protection
3
than that which is afforded to noncommercial speech.
† J.D. candidate 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., English and
Speech, Iowa State University, 1970; M.A., Theatre Arts, University of Minnesota,
1975.
1. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003); see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
2. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247 (concluding that Nike’s “messages are
commercial speech for purposes of applying state laws barring false and
misleading commercial messages”).
3. Id.; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513
(1984) (finding that a noncommercial speaker’s statements criticizing a product
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Consequently, Minnesota companies that do business in
California—or that merely publish operational statements that may
come into contact with a California consumer—have cause for
concern: virtually all of a Minnesota company’s public utterances,
including press releases and letters to the editor, are now
considered to be advertising in California and are subject to
4
prosecution under the state’s False Advertising Law.
Further, if the speech in question is alleged to be false or
misleading, or if any true statements have the capacity to deceive or
confuse the public, the speech will receive no First Amendment
5
Whereas advertising has traditionally been
protection at all.
defined in America as speech that informs the public about “who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
6
price,” the commercial speech doctrine in California now defines
advertising as any type of communication through which a
corporation publicly releases information about its company, its
7
products, its operations, or its values.
To complicate matters further, any California resident—
whether or not suffering personal harm—may bring action under
8
9
the state’s unfair competition and false advertising laws against
any business alleged to have made misleading or confusing
10
statements about its company or products. While the speech of
are noncommercial speech, for which damages may be awarded only upon proof
of both falsehood and actual malice).
4. See generally Kasky, 45 P.3d at 253, 260-61 (holding that press releases and
letters to the editor constituted advertising and thus were “commercial speech,”
affording such speech a lower level of First Amendment protection).
5. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 250 (noting that this court has also recognized that
“these laws prohibit ‘not only advertising which is false, but also advertising
which[,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity,
likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public’”) (citing Leoni v. State
Bar, 704 P.2d 183, 193-94 (Cal. 1985) (alteration in original)); see also id. at 261
(noting that “commercial speech that is false or misleading receives no protection
under the First Amendment”).
6. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
7. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256-58.
8. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2003) (defining unfair competition as
including any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice, or any unfair,
deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising and stating that any act violating
California’s false advertising law—Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500—necessarily
violates the unfair competition law).
9. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (2003).
10. Id. (stating that it is unlawful to disseminate any statement in connection
with an attempt to sell any real or personal property or service “which is untrue or
misleading”). See also Leoni, 704 P.2d at 193-94 (stating that true statements are
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the individuals bringing such charges is given the highest level of
11
protection under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
companies under attack in California no longer are accorded the
12
same level of protection. The Nike decision has thus created an
unlevel playing field in First Amendment protections and threatens
13
to chill corporate speech across America.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed in January 2003 to hear the
14
Commentary on the case
Nike case under a writ of certiorari.
suggested that the real question was not whether the Court would
overturn the California decision, but how resounding the reversal
15
would be.
Discussion centered on the need for the Court to
clarify the definition of “commercial speech” in its decision, or
possibly to do away with the distinction between commercial speech
16
and fully protected speech altogether. Some First Amendment
also prohibited if they are likely to confuse the public).
11. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 513 (requiring proof of both falsehood and
actual malice).
12. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 250 (indicating that to state a claim under either the
UCL or the False Advertising Law, “it is necessary only to show that ‘members of
the public are likely to be deceived.’”) (citing Comm. on Children’s Television,
Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal. 1983)); see also id. at 267-68
(Chin, J., dissenting) (“The majority today refuses to honor a fundamental
commitment and guarantee that both sides in a public debate may compete
vigorously—and equally—in the marketplace of ideas . . . . I would give both sides
in this important public controversy the full protection that our Constitution
guarantees.”).
13. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003).
That threat means a commercial speaker must take particular care—
considerably more than the speaker’s noncommercial opponents—
when speaking on public matters . . . . Uncertainty about how a court
will view these, or other, statements, can easily chill a speaker’s efforts
to engage in public debate—particularly where a “false advertising”
law, like California’s law, imposes liability based upon negligence or
without fault. At the least, they create concern that the commercial
speaker engaging in public debate suffers a handicap that
noncommercial opponents do not.
Id . (citations omitted).
14. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003).
15. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Nike v. Kasky: Will the Shield of the Commercial Speech
Doctrine Become a Sword?, 20 COMM. LAW. 1, 30 (2003) (“[I]t is quite possible that
the biggest question in the Kasky case is not whether the U.S. Supreme Court will
reverse, but whether it will do so with a bang or a whimper.”).
16. See id. at 31 (speculating that the Court may be “willing to use the case to
clarify the parameters of the commercial speech doctrine and to ensure . . . that
the doctrine is not used as a weapon to silence one side of these public
discussions”); see also Michelle Dobrusin, Note, Crass Commercialism: Is It Public
Debate or Sheer Profit? The Controversy of Kasky v. Nike, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 1139, 1166
(2003) (stating that “a review by the High Court will result in a clearer test so as to
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experts considered the case to be “the most significant free-speech
17
18
decision since [New York Times] v. Sullivan [in 1964].”
Thirty Amicus Curiae briefs were filed with the U.S. Supreme
19
Court regarding the free speech issues at stake in Nike.
The
protect the rights of all speakers”).
17. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (establishing
“actual malice” as the standard of proof which must be provided in order to
recover damages for libel related to the official conduct of a public official). In
N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, the publication in question was not a “commercial”
advertisement because it “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses . . . on behalf of a movement whose existence
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.” Id. at 266.
The court further noted that discouraging newspapers from carrying editorial
advertisements might “shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure ‘the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
18. David Graulich, Press Release: Write in Haste . . . Repent, 26 NAT’L L.J. 8, Oct.
14, 2002, at D12; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Nat’l Adver., Inc. et al.,
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003), No. 02-575, 2003 WL 835112, at *1
(U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) (“This case is one of the most important free speech cases to
come before this Court since N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan . . . .”).
19. See Briefs of Amici Curiae, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No.
02-575). Twenty-one amici briefs were filed on behalf of Nike. They were filed by:
Center for Individual Freedom; Business Roundtable; Association of National
Advertising, American Advertising Federation, American Association of
Advertising Agencies; Center for the Advancement of Capitalism; Forty Leading
Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-related
Professional and Trade Associations (including ABC, Inc.; CBS Broadcasting, Inc.;
The New York Times Company; U.S. News & World Report, L.P.; The Washington
Post Co.); American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Northern California; The
United States of America; Mountain States Legal Foundation; Pacific Legal
Foundation, California Manufacturers and Technology Association, California
Chamber of Commerce, New England Legal Foundation; National Association of
Manufacturers; Pfizer, Inc.; Defenders of Property Rights, International Sign
Association; SRiMedia, CoreRatings; Civil Justice Association of California;
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, Media Institute;
Arthur W. Page Society, Council of Public Relations Firms, Institute for Public
Relations, Public Affairs Council, Public Relations Society of America; Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America; Civil Justice Association of California;
Exxonmobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, Glaxosmithkline; Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc.; and Washington Legal Foundation, Allied Educational
Foundation. Eight briefs were filed in support of Kasky: Four Congressional
Representatives (Dennis Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Corrine Brown, Bob Filner);
Campaign Legal Center; National Association of Consumer Advocates;
Reclaimdemocracy.com; Global Exchange; Domini Social Investments, KLD
Research & Analytics, Harrington Investments; The Attorney General of
California, joined by seventeen other state Attorneys General and the Secretary of
Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and Public Citizen Litigation Group.
One brief was filed for neither side but supported Nike on the First Amendment
issue: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO).
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Court, itself, was so interested in the case that it gave both sides an
extra five minutes for oral arguments, extending the normal sixty
20
minutes of argument to seventy minutes.
Briefs were read,
arguments were heard, and the Court did . . . nothing. On June 26,
2003, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its 6-3 decision to dismiss
21
the writ of certiorari as “improvidently granted.”
The Court
decided not to decide and sent the case back to California for
22
further proceedings. This non-decision sent shock waves through
corporate America, public relations firms, the press, labor
organizations, and the international corporate responsibility
23
community.
Then things got worse. Nike decided to settle, stating that it
would rather spend its money on improving working conditions in
24
its overseas factories than on legal fees. Kasky, meanwhile, was
delighted that California got to keep its new commercial speech
25
law.
20. See Tony Mauro, Justices Get Nike out of Their Hair—For Now (March 1,
2003), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=11653
(last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
21. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2554 (2003).
22. Id. at 2559.
23. See Theresa Howard, Advertisers Say Ruling Leaves Them in Limbo, USA
TODAY, June 26, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/
2003-06-26-nikeside_x.htm (quoting Douglas Wood, general counsel to the
Association of National Advertisers: “From an advertisers’ standpoint, it’s the worst
of both worlds . . . . This case now says everything a business says relative to
controversy, but not part of a commercial transaction, is subject to (being ruled)
false and deceptive speech.”); see also Graulich, supra note 18 (stating that lawyers
must now challenge their public relations colleagues to decide “whether the
potential marketing gains of a [press] release justify the inevitable litigation
risks”); Peter Clarke, Analysis: California Supreme Court Decision Potentially Devastating
for Corporate Responsibility Reporting and SRI Funds Worldwide, ETHICAL CORPORATION
ONLINE, Oct. 17, 2002, available at http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?
ContentID=242; (“The California decision is devastating to the efforts of the
media, NGO’s, [and] CSR consultancy firms . . . that encourage corporate
transparency in many ways, including engagement with multi-national enterprises
on corporate social responsibility issues.”); Even Fibs: The First Amendment’s Far
Reach, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Sept. 19, 2003, at A22 (editorializing that the
danger of limiting corporate free speech as a result of the Nike decision is worth
worrying about: “[W]hile some firms definitely deserve to be challenged for their
behavior, they deserve as well the chance to defend themselves . . . . They can’t do
so if every public pronouncement is judged to be advertising”).
24. See Press Release, Nike, Inc., Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of
Kasky v. Nike First Amendment Case (Sept. 12, 2003), at http://www.nike.com/
nikebiz/news/pressrelease.jhtml?year=2003&month=09&letter=f (last visited Apr.
19, 2004).
25. See Lisa Girion, Nike Settles Suit over Sweatshop Statements, STAR TRIBUNE

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 8
MCINTYRE-READY.DOC

1536

5/20/2004 9:38 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

The concern is, indeed, that a California law thought to be not
26
only bad, but unconstitutional, remains alive and well. The
potentially devastating impact of the law derives from the fact that
27
the California economy is the fifth-largest economy in the world.
In a technological economy, most companies cannot do business
28
without touching a California consumer. And, under California
law, it takes only one California consumer to press a costly and
29
hostile lawsuit against any company inside or outside the state.
To explore the full impact of the California and U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in Nike, it is necessary to understand the curious
transmogrification of free speech tenets in America. This note will
examine the history and changes in commercial speech doctrine
30
that have occurred during the twentieth century. The note will
31
then review both the California Kasky decision and the U.S.
32
Supreme Court Nike decision, presenting an analysis of the
ramifications of those decisions on corporate speech, public
33
accessibility to information, and free and open debate. Finally,
the note will conclude that these judicial decisions, themselves, are
34
improvident.
At a time when the country is striving for more
reporting, more corporate disclosure, and more corporate
35
accountability, decisions that muzzle corporate information(Minneapolis), Sept. 13, 2002, at D10 (quoting Kasky’s lawyer, Patrick Coughlin:
“We get to keep the California Supreme Court decision, which we think is
fabulous.”).
26. See Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2568 (Breyer & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (“[I]t
is . . . highly probable that, if this Court were to reach the merits, it would hold
that the heightened scrutiny applies; that . . . California’s delegation of
enforcement authority to private attorneys general disproportionately burdens
speech; and that the First Amendment consequently forbids it.”).
27. See Clarke, supra note 23.
28. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (2003) (adding in 1998 the phrase
“including over the Internet” as a prohibited means of dissemination of false
advertising to California residents).
29. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (2003) (allowing actions to be
prosecuted “upon the complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation, or
association or by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the
general public”). This is commonly known as California’s “private attorney
general” law. See CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, SHAKEDOWN IN “THE GOLDEN
STATE,”
at
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legal_issues/legal_activities/policy_
papers/california_u_c_l.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
30. See infra Part II.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Parts V-VII.
34. See infra Part VIII.
35. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (requiring
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sharing through draconian restrictions on First Amendment rights
of free speech clearly lack foresight.
II. THE TRANSMOGRIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Before 1942, “commercial speech” did not exist. Almost all
forms of speech were thought to be protected by the First
36
Amendment. Commercial speech was invented by the U.S.
37
Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen, a case involving a
businessman’s attempt to circumvent the New York Sanitary Code.
In this case, an enterprising fellow named Valentine hauled a
former U.S. Navy submarine from Florida to New York, hoping to
38
charge admission for tours of the submarine at a city dock. After
Valentine was denied wharfage at a city pier, he docked the
submarine at a state pier in the East River and distributed handbills
39
advertising the exhibit. Police Commissioner Chrestensen then
intervened, citing prohibition under the city’s Sanitary Code of the
distribution of advertising matter “in or upon any street or public
40
place.”
Valentine was apprised, however, that he might freely
distribute handbills that were devoted to “information or a public
41
protest.” Valentine thereupon printed a new handbill with his
submarine ad on one side and a protest against his denial of a city
42
wharfage permit on the other. Chrestensen sued, contending that
43
Valentine was merely attempting to circumvent the city statute.
The suit eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
44
decided against Valentine.
The question before the Court was whether the enforcement
of the ordinance was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom
45
of the press and freedom of speech. The Court determined that
more transparent reporting by American corporations, greater financial
disclosure, and independent audit and accounting functions).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
37. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52 (1942).
38. Id. at 52-53.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 53.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 54.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id. at 54.
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the ordinance could be applied against Valentine, as it was “clear
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
46
respects purely commercial advertising.”
The Court did not
explain just where or how it discovered this special category of
47
unprotected “commercial” speech. The Court made no mention
of prior case law or of the Constitution in arriving at its
48
determination. Indeed, the commercial speech doctrine seemed
49
to be “plucked out of thin air.” Thus emerged a separate category
50
of speech that received no constitutional protection whatsoever.
Commercial speakers languished without First Amendment
protection for more than thirty years. It was not until the landmark
51
case of Bigelow v. Virginia in 1975 that the Court restored some
protection to commercial speech. The Bigelow Court determined
that such speech was, indeed, protected by the First Amendment—
52
although at a lesser level than non-commercial speech.
The
Court held that a balancing test should be applied by courts in
commercial advertising cases to assess “the First Amendment
interest at stake . . . weighing it . . . against the public interest
53
allegedly served by the regulation.”
54
In 1976, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy made an
even stronger case for First Amendment protection of commercial
speech, recognizing that a speaker’s commercial interest should
55
not be dispositive in determining whether speech is commercial.
46. Id.
47. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he [Valentine] ruling was casual, almost offhand.”).
48. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52.
49. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 627 (1990).
50. See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513-14 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing
Valentine v. Chrestensen as holding that “business advertisements and commercial
matters did not enjoy that protection of the First Amendment, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth”).
51. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 809 (1975).
52. Id. at 818 (“Our cases . . . clearly establish that speech is not stripped of
First Amendment protection merely because it appears [as a paid commercial
advertisement] . . . . The fact that the particular advertisement . . . had commercial
aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First
Amendment guarantees.”) (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 826.
54. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 748 (1976) (holding that a Virginia regulation prohibiting the
advertising of prescription drug prices is void and of no effect; that commercial
speech is protected under the First Amendment).
55. Id. at 762 (stating that assuming “the advertiser’s interest is a purely
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The Court noted that commercial speech should receive protection
in order to promote the free marketplace of ideas, providing
information to the public so that decisions may be made by an
56
intelligent and well-informed populace. However, the Court also
created a hierarchy of protected speech by determining that
commercial speech was not equivalent to political or even artistic
57
speech.
The Court rationalized that commercial speech needs
less protection than other types of speech because it is more easily
verifiable by its disseminator than news reporting or political
commentary; that it is more durable than other kinds of speech
due to commercial companies’ dependence on advertising to reap
profits; and that commercial speech, therefore, is less likely to be
58
“chilled” by proper regulation than other types of speech.
By this time, the Valentine decision had been virtually
abandoned. Even Justice Douglas, who sat on the Valentine Court
and concurred in that opinion, agreed that the ruling had “not
59
survived reflection.”
Commercial speech was clearly to be
protected. However, it was not so easily defined.
In 1973, the Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
60
on Human Relations defined commercial speech as speech that
61
does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” In 1980,
the Central Hudson Gas & Electric, Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
62
New York Court determined that commercial speech was
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
63
and its audience.”
In 1983, the Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
64
Corp. Court developed a test establishing three elements, at least
economic one,” the economic interest “hardly disqualifies him from protection
under the First Amendment”).
56. Id. at 765.
57. See id. at 772.
58. See id.
59. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
60. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973).
61. Id. at 385.
62. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980) (holding that “promotional advertising of electricity might
contribute to society’s interest in informed and reliable economic
decisionmaking” and that “the governmental interest in the prohibition [did not]
outweigh[] the . . . constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue”).
63. Id.
64. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that a
statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisement for contraceptives
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two of which needed to be present to support a finding of
commercial speech: the speech (1) must be in the form of an
advertisement, (2) must refer to a specific product, and (3) must
65
show that the speaker has an economic motivation. The Pittsburgh
Press, Central Hudson, and Bolger definitions of commercial speech
continued to exist concurrently until Nike, creating confusion and
eliciting requests for one clear, workable definition of commercial
66
speech.
In addition to the confusion over the definition of commercial
speech, the issue of government regulation was also a cause for
concern as the commercial speech doctrine evolved. Contentbased regulation of noncommercial speech was generally thought
to be valid under the First Amendment only if it could withstand
strict scrutiny; that is, the law required that the regulation be
narrowly tailored to use only the least restrictive means possible to
promote or compel the government’s interest in restricting the
67
speech.
However, there was no established law regarding
government regulation of commercial speech until the Central
68
Hudson ruling in 1980.
In Central Hudson, the Court articulated an intermediate
scrutiny test for commercial speech by establishing a four-part
69
analysis. Under Central Hudson, the first step in the analysis was to
determine whether the speech concerned lawful activity and was
70
not misleading.
If the commercial speech did not pass this
preliminary threshold, then it was not protected by the First
71
If the commercial expression did pass the
Amendment.
violates the First Amendment).
65. Id. at 66-68.
66. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL
835350, at *2 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) (“For many years, the Court has sent conflicting
signals on the definition of ‘commercial speech’ and has allowed the lower courts
to take divergent approaches on this issue.”); see also id. at *3 (noting that the
Court’s “authoritative guidance on the definition of ‘commercial speech’ is much
needed . . .”) see also Fisher, supra note 15, at 30 (stating that the Court should
finally “issue a clear definition of commercial speech”).
67. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (citing United States
v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, (2000); Consol. Edison Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)).
68. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
69. Id. at 566.
70. Id.
71. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 434 (1993)
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preliminary threshold, then the government was required to show
(1) that the asserted governmental interest in regulating the
expression was “substantial,” (2) that the regulation at issue directly
advanced that interest, and (3) that the regulation was not more
72
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Although meant to
clarify the commercial speech doctrine, the result of the Central
Hudson decision was to generate even more confusion and
commentary regarding just what types of regulation the four-part
73
test permitted.
The last part of the Central Hudson test—requiring that the
regulation imposed be no more extensive than necessary to serve
the governmental interest—was clarified by Board of Trustees of State
74
University of New York v. Fox in 1989. The Fox Court determined
that the intermediate scrutiny test does not require the least
restrictive means of enforcement, but only a “reasonable fit”
between the government’s purpose and the means chosen to
75
achieve it.
Throughout this transmutation of the commercial speech
doctrine, there were signs of uneasiness on the Court. Justice
Stevens expressed his concern in a separate concurring opinion in
Bolger that the Court was creating the impression that commercial
speech “is a fairly definite category of communication that is

(Blackmun, J., concurring).
72. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
73. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 49, at 631 (“[E]ver since [Central
Hudson], judges and Justices have filled quite a bit of space . . . trying to figure out
precisely what forms of regulation the four-part test permits . . . . Unless a case has
facts very much like those of a prior case, it is nearly impossible to predict the
winner.”); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1, 34 (2000) (noting that the Central Hudson test “has subsequently
been interpreted from radically different perspectives, and although it has been
attacked by numerous justices, it has nevertheless remained the dominant test”
(citations omitted)). See also id. at 1 (noting that the test is “abstract and
unhelpful, because it does not reflect any particular account of the constitutional
function of commercial speech”).
74. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (declining to
impose a “least-restrictive means” requirement on government regulation of
commercial speech; requiring the state to affirmatively establish a “reasonable
fit”).
75. Id. at 480 (stating that the Court requires a “fit” between “the legislature’s
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.” The fit does not have to
be “perfect,” but “reasonable.” It should represent “not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served.’ ” It need
not employ the least restrictive means but a means “narrowly tailored to achieve
the desired objective” (citations omitted)).
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protected by a fairly definite set of rules that differ from those
76
protecting other categories of speech.” Moreover, Justice Stevens
expressed his concern that the establishment of “rigid
classifications” might inadvertently suppress speech entitled to
77
constitutional protection.
Then, anticipating the next topic of
debate in commercial speech evolution, Justice Stevens broached
the issue of mixed speech, noting that “advertisements may be
complex mixtures of commercial and noncommercial
78
elements . . . .”
The issue of mixed speech was considered by the Court in Riley
79
80
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc. and Fox in
1988 and 1989, respectively. The essence of the two cases was that
the Court did not believe that speech retains its commercial
character when the commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined
81
with otherwise fully protected speech.” To determine the degree
of scrutiny to be applied, the nature of the speech taken as a whole
must be considered, without parceling out the speech and applying
82
one test to one phrase and another test to another. Therefore, in
cases of inextricably intertwined speech, the speech is considered
to be noncommercial and the Court will apply the test for fully
83
protected speech.
Recent commercial speech decisions have found members of
the Court questioning the efficacy of trying to separate commercial
from noncommercial speech, as well as the validity of the
84
distinction itself.
Through its long and difficult history, the
76. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988)
(holding that statutory fee limitations, disclosures, and licenses for professional
fundraisers unconstitutionally infringed upon freedom of speech).
80. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that
governmental restrictions upon commercial speech need not be the absolute least
restrictive means to achieve the desired end).
81. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “the near impossibility of severing ‘commercial’
speech from speech necessary to democratic decisionmaking”); see also United
Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.
1998) (citing Thomas’ concurring opinion in Liquormart and stating that “[t]he
current debate centers not on whether commercial speech is a form of expression
entitled to constitutional protection, but on the validity of the distinction between
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evolution of commercial speech has been a contentious
undertaking, viewed by some as the most divisive realm of First
85
Amendment law. Consequently, legal scholars eagerly anticipated
the resolution of the Nike case in 2003, hoping that the Court
would bring some long-sought clarity to the commercial speech
doctrine.
III. THE CALIFORNIA CASE: KASKY V. NIKE, INC.
The underlying suit in the Nike case was brought as a result of
Nike’s response to a series of allegations that it was mistreating and
underpaying workers in foreign facilities. As part of a worldwide
campaign against economic globalization, Nike was targeted by a
86
group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a broad and
87
noisy protest against Nike’s overseas labor practices. The NGOs
capitalized on a series of reports presented by Vietnam Labor
Watch, which conducted interviews with thirty-five of Nike’s
300,000 to 500,000 workers employed in Asian factories; and the
Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, which studied several
88
These
Chinese factories, three of which were used by Nike.
reports were picked up by American media, resulting in widespread
public scrutiny and culminating in a series of eight articles in The
New York Times during 1996 and 1997, as well as a critical report on
commercial and noncommercial speech”); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (Stevens, J., writing for the majority,
joined by O’Connor, J., Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.) (“This very case
illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial
speech in a distinct category.”).
85. See Post, supra note 73, at 2.
86. See BOYCOTT NIKE, at http://www.saigon.com/~nike/index.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (listing Nike protest organizations as: Press for Change, the
National Labor Committee, Global Exchange, Campaign for Labor Rights,
National Organization of Women, Clean Clothes Campaign, Community Aid
Abroad, The Living Wage Project, Justice Do It Nike, and several other NGOs).
See also Living with the Enemy, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1975902
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (“NGOs are increasingly pursuing their campaigns within
America’s notoriously plaintiff-friendly legal system, with its potential for huge
payouts.”).
87. See Sweatshops, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, at http://www.globalexchange.org/
campaigns/sweatshops/nike/faq.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (asking, “Why
pick on Nike, if other shoe companies are just as bad?” and answering, “Nike is the
biggest shoe company in the world and puts itself forth as an industry leader . . . .
By targeting the industry leader, we hoped to make changes throughout the whole
industry”).
88. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 2000).
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89

the CBS television show 48 Hours.
Additionally, NGO websites
posted information designed to encourage students to conduct
anti-Nike campaigns on their college campuses, to pass city
resolutions against Nike, to conduct letters-to-the-editor campaigns,
90
and to engage in Nike boycotts.
None of the allegations against Nike referred to Nike’s
91
products. Rather, the charges were that Nike “was an immoral
company, generating great profits on the backs of Third World
92
Labor.” The charges of moral irresponsibility were coupled with
demands for consumer boycotts and legislative action against
93
Nike.
Nike responded to the public outcry with its own public
94
relations campaign. The company commissioned former United
Nations Ambassador Andrew Young to conduct an independent
review of its overseas operations and issued a number of press
95
releases responding to the sweatshop allegations.
The press
releases denied exploitation of underage workers, outlined the
company’s code of conduct, and responded to charges regarding
its labor practices with detailed information and footnoted
96
sources.
Nike also sent a letter to the presidents and athletic
directors of colleges sponsoring Nike products, defending its labor
97
practices. Additionally, Nike officials sent a letter to the editor of
89. Id. at 856-57.
90. See Campaign Starter Kit, Global Exchange, at http://www.globalexchange.
org/campaigns/sweatshops/nike/actnow.html.pf (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
91. Brief for Petitioner, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (No. 02-575) 2003 WL 898993 at
*2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (2000).
95. Id. at 856.
96. Id. at 857.
97. Id. See also Tony Mauro, High Court Appears Ready to Side with Nike in FreeSpeech Dispute, First Amendment Topics (Apr. 24, 2003), at http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=11384&SearchString=kasky
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (indicating that this letter, directed to athletic directors who
may purchase Nike products, was later referred to in the U.S. Supreme Court oral
arguments as the document that came the closest to commercial speech). See
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2570-71 (2003) for the text of the letter:
June 18, 1996
Dear President and Director of Athletics,
As most of you have probably read, heard, or seen, NIKE, Inc. has
recently come under attack from the Made in the USA Foundation and
other labor organizers, who claim that child labor is used in the
production of its goods. While you may also be aware that NIKE has
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The New York Times in response to its series of critical articles.

gone on the record to categorically deny these allegations as
completely false and irresponsible, I would like to extend the courtesy
of providing you with many of the facts that have been absent from the
media discourse on this issue. I hope you will find this information
useful in discussions with faculty and students who may be equally
disturbed by these charges.
First and foremost, wherever NIKE operates around the globe, it is
guided by principles set forth in a code of conduct that holds its
production subcontractors to a signed Memorandum of
Understanding. This Memorandum strictly prohibits child labor, and
certifies compliance with applicable government regulations regarding
minimum wage and overtime, as well as occupational health and safety,
environmental regulations, worker insurance and equal opportunity
provisions.
NIKE enforces its standards through daily observation by staff members
who are responsible for monitoring adherence to the Memorandum.
NIKE currently employs approximately 800 staff members in Asia alone
to oversee operations. Every NIKE subcontractor knows that the
enforcement of the Memorandum includes systematic, unannounced
evaluation by third-party auditors. These thorough reviews include
interviews with workers, examination of safety equipment and
procedures, review of free health-care facilities, investigation of worker
grievances and audits of payroll records.
Furthermore, over the past 20 years we have established long-term
relationships with select subcontractors, and we believe that our sense
of corporate responsibility has influenced the way they conduct their
business. After all, it is incumbent upon leaders like NIKE to ensure
that these violations do not occur in our subcontractor’s [sic] factories.
We have found over the years that, given the vast area of our
operations and the difficulty of policing such a network, some
violations occur. However, we have been proud that in all material
respects the code of conduct is complied with. The code is not just
word. We live by it. NIKE is proud of its contribution in helping to
build economies, provide skills, and create a brighter future for
millions of workers around the world.
As a former Director of Athletics, and currently the Director of Sports
Marketing at NIKE, I am indeed sensitive to these issues. I would be
more than happy to make myself available to either discuss these issues
and/or receive any opinions or insights you may have. We are
committed to the world of sports and all that it stands for. I remain at
your disposal.
Kindest regards,
Steve Miller
Director
NIKE Sports Marketing
Id.
98. See Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857. See also The Associated Press, Supreme
Court Punts Commercial-Speech Case, First Amendment Topics (June 26, 2003), at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=11648 (last visited Apr. 19,
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99

Enter Marc Kasky, a San Francisco community activist, who
had read about Nike’s labor practices and decided to file a lawsuit
against Nike under California’s Unfair Competition and False
100
Advertising Laws. Kasky obtained the support of a “powerhouse”
law firm reputed to fuel its success by “filing lawsuits against multinational corporations and receiving massive fees out of any
101
settlements or judgments.”
Kasky was able to file the suit on
102
behalf of the general public of the State of California as a private
citizen alleging “no harm or damages whatsoever regarding himself
103
individually” under California’s unique private attorney general
104
Unlike other states, where the state’s elected Attorney
law.
General must file similar complaints, California allows any citizen
under section 17204 of its Unfair Competition Law (UCL) to file a
105
complaint in the interest of the general public.
In his complaint, Kasky contended that Nike had made
“misrepresentations by the use of false statements and/or material
omissions of fact,” in seven specific statements contained in its
106
“ubiquitous and successful promotional scheme.”
Kasky sought,
among other things, (a) an injunction ordering Nike to disgorge
all monies earned through any unlawful and/or unfair business
practice, (b) an order for Nike to undertake a court-approved
public information campaign to correct any misleading or deceitful
107
statements, and (c) attorneys’ fees and costs.
2004) (indicating that Nike sent a letter to the editor of The New York Times,
submitted press releases, and posted information on its corporate Web site).
99. See NIKE Sued Over Sweatshop Conditions, SweatshopWatch.Org (Apr. 20,
1998) at http://sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/headlines/1998/nikesued_apr98.
html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (stating that Kasky was a high-profile activist, fresh
from a settlement in the lawsuit that outlawed Joe Camel).
100. See Clarke, supra note 23.
101. Id.
102. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive
Relief (Apr. 20, 1998), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/PRT.jsp?
articleid=3448 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
103. Id.
104. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (2003).
105. Id. See also Mauro, supra note 97 (“California consumer-protection laws
allow ‘unelected, unaccountable private enforcers’ to sue companies at
random . . . . [A]nyone with a whim or grievance against a company could become
a ‘government-licensed censor.’ ”) (quoting Solicitor General Theodore Olson,
arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court on Nike’s behalf).
106. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Complaint for Statutory, Equitable and Injunctive
Relief (Apr. 20, 1998), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/PRT.jsp?
articleid=3448 (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
107. Id.
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The California trial court dismissed the suit, agreeing with
Nike’s demurrer to the complaint contending that the suit was
108
absolutely barred by the First Amendment.
The appeals court
agreed, stating that “the case at bar lies in familiar First
Amendment territory—public dialogue on a matter of public
concern. Though drafted in terms of commercial speech, the
109
complaint in fact seeks judicial intervention in a public debate.”
The appeals court concluded that Nike’s press releases and letters
were part of a public dialogue on a matter of public concern
“within the core area of expression protected by the First
110
Amendment.”
On appeal, the California Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision,
reversed the lower courts, holding that Nike’s messages were
“directed by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience” and
“made representations of fact about the speaker’s own business
111
operations for the purposes of promoting sales of its products.”
The messages therefore were “commercial speech for purposes of
applying state laws barring false and misleading commercial
112
messages.”
The California Supreme Court then sent the case
back to the lower courts to determine if, in fact, any of Nike’s
113
statements was false or misleading.
Three justices dissented, with Justices Chin and Brown
providing lengthy and vigorous rejections of the majority
114
opinion.
Both justices (and Justice Baxter, concurring with
Justice Chin) concluded that Nike’s press releases, letters to the
108. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (2000) (stating that the
trial court “regarded the constitutional distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech to be dispositive”).
109. Id. at 860. The appeals court went on to say:
Nike exemplifies the perceived evils or benefits of labor practices
associated with the processes of economic globalization . . . . Nike’s
strong corporate image . . . places its labor practices in the context of a
broader debate about the social implications of employing low-cost
foreign labor for manufacturing functions once performed by
domestic workers. We take judicial notice that this debate has given
rise to urgent calls for action ranging from international labor
standards to consumer boycotts. Information about the labor practices
at Nike’s overseas plants thus constitutes data relevant to a controversy
of great public interest in our times.
Id. at 861.
110. Id. at 863.
111. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 262-63.
114. Id. at 263-80.
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editor, and other communications concerning the attacks on its
labor practices were not commercial speech and were deserving of
115
full First Amendment protection.
Justice Chin also noted the
inequitable playing field created by the California ruling,
concluding that “[h]andicapping one side in the important
116
worldwide debate is both ill considered and unconstitutional.”
Justice Brown concluded that the commercial elements in
Nike’s statements were “inextricably intertwined” with its
117
noncommercial elements.
She criticized the U.S. Supreme
118
Court’s inability to define the elements of commercial speech,
contending that “the commercial speech doctrine, in its current
form, fails to account for the realities of the modern world—a
world in which personal, political, and commercial arenas no
119
longer have sharply defined boundaries.”
Justice Brown then
called on the high court to develop “a more nuanced approach
that maximizes the ability of businesses to participate in the public
120
debate while minimizing consumer fraud.”
Nike filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court,
requesting that the Court hear the case without further intervening
proceedings. The two questions to be decided were (a) whether
the speech of a corporation participating in a public debate could
be properly characterized as commercial speech, and (b) whether
the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, permitted speakers to be subjected to the
“legal regime” in California which allows any unharmed, private
121
citizen to sue on behalf of the general public.

115. Id.
116. Id. at 263. Justice Chin also noted:
Various persons and organizations have accused Nike of engaging in
despicable practices, which they have described sometimes with such
caustic and scathing words as “slavery” and “sweatshop.” Nike’s critics
and these accusations receive full First Amendment protection . . . .
When Nike tries to defend itself from these attacks, the majority denies
it the same First Amendment protection Nike’s critics enjoy. Why is
this, according to the majority? Because Nike competes not only in the
marketplace of ideas, but also in the marketplace of manufactured
goods.
Id.
117. Id. at 269.
118. Id. at 268-69.
119. Id. at 269.
120. Id. at 270.
121. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2555 (2003).
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IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE: NIKE, INC. V. KASKY
The U.S. Supreme Court did not answer the questions
presented to it in the writ, nor did it decide the Nike case on its
merits. Instead, the Court dismissed the case on procedural
grounds, issuing an unsigned one-sentence statement: “The writ of
122
Although such
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.”
procedural dismissal is not uncommon—the same statement has
been used to dismiss cases accepted upon a writ of certiorari
123
approximately seventy-five times since 1945 —the Court’s decision
surprised commentators attending the oral arguments, who felt
124
that Nike had won.
Also surprising was the fact that lengthy opinions were issued
125
on both sides of the controversy. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Souter wrote that the case was not properly before the Court and
126
Justices Breyer,
that dismissal was therefore warranted.
O’Connor, and Kennedy wrote in dissent, stating that the Court
127
should have rendered a decision on the merits.
The three
remaining Justices remained silent but joined in the decision to
dismiss.
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter)
determined that the Court had three valid reasons for its decision
to dismiss the writ: (1) the judgment entered by the California
Supreme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
section 1257; (2) neither party had standing in federal court; and
(3) the Court was averse to “premature adjudication of novel
128
constitutional questions.”
Justice Breyer (joined by Justice O’Connor) disagreed
regarding all three reasons for dismissal, asserting the existence of
122. Id. at 2554.
123. See Westlaw Search for Supreme Court cases after 1944: “writ of certiorari
is dismissed as improvidently granted.”
124. See Mauro, supra note 97 (“At the end of 70 minutes of oral argument
yesterday, the Supreme Court appeared ready to agree that under the First
Amendment, Nike should not be subjected to a lawsuit by California activist Marc
Kasky . . . .”). See also id. (quoting First Amendment Center scholar Ronald Collins
as saying “[i]f they get through the jurisdictional thicket, I think Nike wins”).
125. Of the last twenty cases dismissed because the “writ of certiorari was
improvidently granted,” only five cases, including Nike, have included a written
opinion. The other fifteen cases provided no reasoning for the Court’s decision
and no opinion.
126. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2554.
127. Id. at 2559.
128. See id. at 2555.
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a clear constitutional issue that demanded resolution.
Further,
the dissenting judges contended that the Court’s delay in issuing a
decision on the underlying free speech issues would impose a
130
serious burden upon speech and would “limit the supply of
relevant information available to those, such as journalists, who
131
seek to keep the public informed about important public issues.”
In the dissent, Justice Breyer also opined that the
communications at issue, as in Riley, were best characterized as a
132
mixture of commercial and noncommercial speech.
He focused
particularly on Nike’s letter to university presidents and athletic
133
directors as containing several commercial elements, thereby
134
serving as the Nike document least likely to warrant protection.
However, Justice Breyer noted, the letter also contained substantial
noncommercial characteristics: it appeared outside a traditional
advertising format, it did not propose the sale of a product or any
other commercial transaction, and on its face it sought to provide
information to a “diverse audience” regarding the public
135
controversy surrounding Nike.
As these noncommercial
characteristics were “inextricably intertwined” with the commercial
characteristics, the speech did not represent core commercial
136
speech and should be afforded full First Amendment protection.
Further, Justice Breyer concluded that the regulatory regime
in California—involving the use of private attorneys general to
press false advertising lawsuits—could not survive heightened
137
scrutiny in the matter.
The Justice noted that “there is no

129. See id. at 2562 (“No federal statute prevents us from hearing this case . . . .
[T]his Court has interpreted the . . . phrase ‘final judgment’ to refer . . . to a state
court’s final determination of a federal issue, even if the determination of that
issue occurs in the midst of ongoing litigation.”); see also id. at 2563 (stating that
“[t]he California Supreme Court [has] ‘finally decided’ the federal issue—
whether the First Amendment protects the speech in question from legal attack on
the ground that it is ‘false or misleading’ ”).
130. Id. at 2560 (noting that the issues in question “directly concern the
freedom of Americans to speak about public matters in public debate,” that “no
jurisdictional rule prevents us from deciding those questions now,” and that “delay
itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech
without making the issue significantly easier to decide later on”).
131. Id. at 2568.
132. See id. at 2565.
133. See text of letter, supra note 97.
134. See Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2565.
135. Id. at 2565-66.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 2566.
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reasonable ‘fit’ between the burden it imposes upon speech and
138
“The delegation
the important governmental ‘interest served.’ ”
of state authority to private individuals authorizes a purely
ideological plaintiff, convinced that his opponent is not telling the
truth, to bring into the courtroom the kind of political battle better
139
waged in other forums.”
Justice Breyer concluded that it was likely, if not highly
probable, that if the Court were to reach a decision on the merits
of the Nike case, it would hold that California’s delegation of
enforcement authority to private attorneys general is
140
Additionally,
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Justice Breyer speculated that reversal of the California Supreme
Court on the federal issue of commercial speech would be a serious
141
possibility.
After the case was dismissed and sent back to California for
142
further proceedings, the parties decided to settle out of court. In
the settlement, Nike agreed to contribute $1.5 million to the Fair
143
Labor Association, a consortium of companies, universities, and
144
Nike also agreed to
NGOs promoting respect for labor rights.
maintain its existing funding at a minimum of $500,000 over the
next two years to continue its after-hours worker education
145
programs and micro-loan programs.
The law firm representing
Kasky received substantial fees for its services, and Kasky retained
the ability to individually sue other corporations in California as a
private attorney general under California’s new commercial speech

138. Id.
139. Id. at 2567. Justice Breyer added that when a political battle is being
fought, “such plaintiffs potentially constitute a large and hostile crowd freely able
to bring prosecutions designed to vindicate their beliefs, and to do so
unencumbered by the legal and practical checks that tend to keep the energies of
public enforcement agencies focused upon more purely economic harm.” Id.
140. See id. at 2568.
141. See id.
142. See Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike First Amendment
Case, supra note 24.
143. Id.
144. See About Us, FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION, at http://www.fairlabor.org/all/
about/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (noting that there are currently
thirteen leading brand-name participants in the coalition: Adidas-Salomon, Eddie
Bauer, GEAR for Sports, Gildan Activewear, Liz Claiborne, New Era Cap,
Nordstrom, Nike, Patagonia, Puma, Reebok, Phillips-Van Heusen, and Zephyr
Graf-X).
145. See Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike First Amendment
Case, supra note 24.
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146

V. ANALYSIS: OPPORTUNITY LOST
By dismissing Nike, the Court lost its opportunity to review and
potentially overturn the California commercial speech ruling. It
also lost the opportunity to declare the California private attorney
general law unconstitutional. Perhaps most importantly, the Court
lost its opportunity to clarify and refine the country’s perplexing
commercial speech doctrine.
A. The California Commercial Speech “Limited Purpose Test”
Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had not adopted an “allpurpose” test to distinguish commercial from noncommercial
speech, the California Supreme Court decided to create its own
147
test. The court referred to its new test as a “limited purpose test”
to be used “when a court must decide whether particular speech
may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or
148
other forms of commercial deception.” The court took the Bolger
test and fashioned it to fit its own needs. Whereas Bolger required
that the speech in question must be in the form of an
advertisement, referring to a specific product, and showing that the
speaker has an economic motivation, the new Kasky test eliminated
the advertising format requirement, added the element of the
speaker’s identity, and broadened the definition of products or
149
services. The resulting three elements became the Kaksy “limited
purpose test” for commercial speech: (1) There must be a speaker
engaged in commerce, speaking to (2) an intended audience of
actual or potential buyers or customers or persons (such as
reporters or reviewers) likely to repeat the message to or otherwise
influence actual or potential buyers, stating (3) a commercial
message representing facts about the business operations, products,
or services of the speaker, made for the purpose of promoting sales
of, or other commercial transactions in, the speaker’s products or
150
services.
Under the Kasky test, product references are deemed to
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Girion, supra note 25, at D10.
See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002).
Id.
See id. at 311-12.
See id.
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include not only statements about price, quality, or availability of
products, but “statements about the manner in which the products
are manufactured, distributed, or sold, about repair or warranty
services that the seller provides to purchasers of the product, or
about the identity or qualifications of persons who manufacture,
151
distribute, sell, service, or endorse the product.”
References to
services would include not only statements about the price,
availability, and quality of the services, but also “statements about
the education, experience, and qualifications of the persons
152
providing or endorsing the services.”
This broad definition was necessary, according to the Kasky
court, to protect consumers from the modern image campaigns,
which have become a popular vehicle for promoting products and
153
services.
However, as the speech in question did not meet the
requirements of any of the three existing Supreme Court
commercial speech tests, it is clear that the California court could
not find for Kasky without creating a new definition of commercial
speech. Certainly, Nike’s speech did more than “propose a
commercial transaction” (Pittsburgh Press). It was not speech
“related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience” (Central Hudson), and it was not in the form of an
advertisement, nor did it refer to a specific product (Bolger).
Consequently, the California court could not overturn the lower
court rulings without devising a new test that cast a much wider net.
The problem, of course, is that the new Kasky definition of
commercial speech is so broad that virtually any statement made by
a corporation will fall under it. Every business is engaged in
commerce in some fashion, so every company meets the first
requirement. Under Kasky, press releases, newspaper editorials,
websites, and other forms of communication with the general
public are deemed to reach prospective buyers, so all
communications released by a business—no matter how general in
nature—seem to satisfy Kasky’s second requirement. In terms of
commercial content, it is easily argued that everything a company
does or says is ultimately geared to selling products or services and
producing revenue for the company. All corporate speech is
designed to promote profitability and therefore can be construed
to satisfy the third requirement of the Kasky limited purpose
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 312.
Id.
See id. at 312-13.
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commercial speech test. Thus, under Kasky, no corporate speaker
can escape the limited purpose test in any of its public utterances.
In casting its wide net in a “limited” manner, the California
court not only expanded its own prior definition of commercial
speech, but it precluded consideration of Supreme Court cases that
directly conflict with the Kasky result. Previously, the court had
defined commercial speech as speech “which has but one
154
purpose—to advance an economic transaction.”
In deciding Kasky,
155
the court disapproved that definition as “ill-considered.” Further,
the court was able to circumvent Riley, the seminal case pertaining
to intermingled speech, as being outside of its own limited purpose
definition. In refusing to apply Riley, the court noted that the Riley
decision “concerned regulation of charitable solicitations, a
category of speech that does not fit within our limited-purpose
156
definition of commercial speech . . . .”
It would appear, then,
that the California court purposely fashioned its new definition, at
least in part, to allow it to reach its desired outcome.
The broadness of the Kasky “limited purpose test,” alone, is
very problematic as it relates to First Amendment protections.
Because the Court also failed to follow precedential Supreme Court
doctrine and chose to create an unlevel playing field for public
debate, the result in Kasky does not appear to be viable under the
First Amendment.
B. The California Private Attorney General Law
Perhaps even more troubling is the matter of California’s
Unfair Competition Law (UCL), also known as the “private,
157
Justice Breyer made it clear in his dissent
attorney general” law.
in Nike that using the private attorney general law to press false
advertising lawsuits could not withstand heightened scrutiny, as
there is no “reasonable fit” between the government interest served
158
by the regulation and the burden it imposes upon speech.
The Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC) posed an
159
even broader challenge to the UCL in its Nike amicus brief. The
154. See id. at 261.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 260.
157. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (allowing actions to be prosecuted
upon complaint by any person acting for the interests of the general public).
158. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2566 (2003).
159. Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Justice Association of California, Nike v. Kasky,
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CJAC maintained that the UCL violates a number of other
constitutional rights beyond the First Amendment. Specifically, the
CJAC explained that the UCL violates due process because it fails
160
to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. It also violates
due process by allowing defendants to be subjected to repeated
161
lawsuits for the same conduct.
Additionally, the UCL
162
impermissibly delegates governmental power to private persons,
allowing any unelected, unaccountable person to prosecute
independent of the Attorney General or District Attorney. Further,
the UCL permits private persons to sue on federal issues even if the
federal statute does not allow for private suits, raising a clear issue
163
regarding separation of powers.
The UCL also impermissibly
imposes its own state law on other states, allowing California to sue
parties “extraterritorially” under the UCL for acts that are not
164
illegal in the states where the conduct occurs.
Given the
multitude of potential constitutional violations accorded to the
UCL, it seems quite remarkable that the law has managed to survive
in California for the past sixty years.
The CJAC also appended to its brief a chart detailing the
reasons why Kasky’s claim would fail under the unfair trade
practice and/or false advertising laws currently in place in every
165
other state. The most prominent reason for failure is “no injury”
166
Other reasons for failing to meet
or “no likelihood of injury.”
123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835411 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003).
160. Id. at *11-17 (“[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibits . . . .”) (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03
(1966)).
161. See id. at *18-21 (“The UCL creates an impermissible risk of repetitive
punishment because there is no finality to that litigation. A suit by one plaintiff
does not prevent another self-appointed ‘private attorney general’ from suing the
same defendant on precisely the same theory.”).
162. See id. at *21-26 (noting that, while states are ordinarily free to determine
their own standing rules, the UCL “obliterates any semblance of a standing
requirement—[and] it turns over the machinery of state government to politically
unaccountable private plaintiffs acting as bounty hunters”).
163. See id. at *24 (noting that the UCL also undermines the powers of the
Executive regarding enforcement of federal law, thus violating Article II, Section 3
of the U.S. Constitution) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577
(1992)).
164. See id. at *26-30 (noting that the UCL extends California law to cover
“nationwide business conduct”; it authorizes California courts to “punish conduct
or speech that offends the UCL’s vague provisions no matter where it occurs”).
165. Id. at *30.
166. See id.
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state requirements are: no private cause of action, no product
reference, not a victim, not an actual/potential consumer, no
purchase, no ascertainable loss of money or property, no reliance,
representative capacity not allowed, not material, enforcement only
allowed by Attorney General, no remedy available other than actual
167
damages, no prior notice, no causal connection.
Under this analysis, the Kasky suit could not have prevailed in
any state other than California. Although that fact alone does not
make the California law bad law, it does give a whole new spin to
the “caveat emptor” maxim: Buyers and sellers, alike, must
“beware” when doing business in California.
Given the plethora of constitutional issues raised by
commentators, friends of the Court, and the Supreme Court, itself,
it seems unlikely that the UCL would survive a constitutional
challenge if the issue were decided on the merits.
C. The Perplexing Commercial Speech Doctrine
In attempting to make sense of the current commercial speech
doctrine, three particular areas of discussion are of interest: (1)
reasons for the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech, (2) changes in the world of
communication and advertising since 1942, and (3) the public’s
right to receive information.
1. Why Is There a Separate Commercial Speech Doctrine?
Because the Valentine Court provided no reasoned support or
justification for the commercial speech doctrine at the time of its
creation, successors have been challenged to make some sense of it.
Some say that a separate commercial speech category is necessary
168
Others
to overcome the danger of “uninformed acquiescence.”
justify the need for a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech based on the need to prevent “commercial
169
harm.”
The idea of “uninformed acquiescence” encompasses the
possibility that consumers may respond to false advertisements
“before there is time for more speech and considered reflection to
167. Id.
168. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1993) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1978)).
169. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993).
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170

minimize the risks of being misled.”
Theoretically, government
regulation of commercial speech is necessary because it is the only
way to keep uninformed consumers from being led astray. The
antidote, of course, is counterspeech—the dissemination of more
information to consumers, not less. Counterspeech is provided by
competitors, the media, organized consumer groups, politicians,
and even neighbors conversing over the back fence. In the new
age of advertising, where consumers are inundated with
information regarding product claims and characteristics,
counterspeech is a powerful influence in protecting consumer
interests and in assisting consumer decisionmaking. Modern
consumers also have access to the Internet, through which they can
investigate virtually any product claim. It takes little effort for a
savvy consumer to become informed on most issues.
“Commercial harm” is the presumed result of commercial
171
speech’s potential to mislead and is the “typical reason why
commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental
172
regulation than noncommercial speech.”
Looking back to the
birth of the commercial speech doctrine in Valentine, one might
ask, “Where’s the commercial harm?” Indeed, the underlying issue
in Valentine was littering, not speech. The statute being challenged
was the New York Sanitary Code, which dictated that handbills
containing advertising were apparently more unsightly or more apt
to despoil the city streets than handbills that did not contain
advertising. It is unclear how the harm created from distributing a
commercial handbill would be any greater than the harm from
distributing a noncommercial handbill. It is also unclear how a
statute banning the distribution of commercial handbills but
allowing the distribution of noncommercial handbills would keep
the streets free of litter. If the Valentine case had been heard by the
173
Court in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. in 1993, the
170. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens also notes that “[t]he evils of false commercial
speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact on commercial
transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to
control falsehoods, explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this
speech than of most other speech.” Id.
171. See id. at 494-96 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[F]alse commercial speech can
be particularly severe: Investors may lose their savings, and consumers may
purchase products that are more dangerous than they believe or that do not work
as advertised.”).
172. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 426.
173. Id.
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result would have been markedly different.
In Discovery Network, the City of Cincinnati had granted
permission to a publisher to place its free promotional magazine in
a number of city news racks on public property, alongside news
174
racks selling various newspapers. Subsequently, the city passed an
ordinance banning the promotional magazines but allowing the
175
newspapers to remain.
The city based its ban on a municipal
code that prohibited the distribution or sale of “commercial
handbills” in any public place; the same code specified that it was
176
not unlawful to distribute non-commercial handbills.
The city
argued that its preferential treatment of newspapers over
commercial publications permissibly served its interest in “ensuring
177
safe streets and regulating visual blight.”
The Court disagreed, noting that there was insufficient
justification to discriminate against the use of a specified category
of news racks that was no more harmful than the use of the
178
permitted news racks.
Further, the Court stated that the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech “bears
no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has
179
asserted.”
Because commercial and noncommercial handbills
were both equally responsible for the “safety concerns and visual
blight” and because the distinction of commercial versus
noncommercial speech bore no relationship to the city’s interests,
the ordinance was “an impermissible means of responding to those
180
interests.”
The city had not asserted an interest in preventing
commercial harms by regulating the information distributed by
Discovery Network; therefore, there was no “reasonable fit”
between the government’s interest and the means of regulation
181
Consequently, the city’s ordinance against
employed.
commercial handbills was overturned based on the protection
174. Id. at 412.
175. Id. at 413-14.
176. Id. at 414.
177. Id. at 415.
178. See id. at 425 (stating that “[t]he city has asserted an interest in esthetics,
but respondent publishers’ newsracks are no greater eyesore than the newsracks
permitted to remain on Cincinnati’s sidewalks.”).
179. Id. at 424.
180. Id. at 411.
181. Id. at 426. See also id. at 414 (stating that the city had the burden of
establishing “a reasonable ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends”) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989)).
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182

afforded by the First Amendment.
Given the remarkable similarities between the modern-day
Discovery Network “commercial handbill” case and its forerunner,
Valentine, it seems almost certain that the Discovery Network Court
would have overturned Valentine’s “commercial handbill” ordinance
based on the same First Amendment protections. Had the Court
found for Valentine, the new commercial speech doctrine invented
by that Court in 1942 would not have materialized. Perhaps this
new and lesser-privileged category of speech might have been
created at some future date, but it seems likely that it would have
occurred a great deal later and in a more defined form, if at all.
Given the constitutional vagaries of the commercial speech
doctrine, one might wonder whether the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech would ever have occurred,
had it not been for Mr. Valentine and his submarine.
2. The Changing World of Advertising
The Kasky court, in devising a new “limited purpose” definition
of commercial speech, did raise legitimate concerns regarding
183
modern image campaigns.
The existing commercial speech
doctrine governing anything other than standard product
advertising is cloudy at best. “Direct image advertising,” which
184
“treats the company as a product,” has grown in popularity over
the years, concurrent with the explosion of advertising through
multiple modes of modern delivery. Hundreds of television
channels, thousands of radio stations, a proliferation of print
media, the Internet, and even movie theatres offer expanded
outlets for the avalanche of advertising that descends upon the
American consumer daily. With this growth in the industry has
come considerable change in the methodology and psychology of
185
selling products and services.
Often, the company itself is being
186
Modern examples include the Philip Morris television
“sold.”
182. Id. at 431.
183. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 257 (Cal. 2002) (noting that modern,
sophisticated public relations campaigns often seek to enhance the image of
products, the manufacturer, or the seller of the product).
184. Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L.
REV. 55, 120 (1999).
185. See id. at 124-26 (discussing other modern forms of advertising that are
difficult to categorize, such as “camouflaged promotion” and “product
placements”).
186. See id. at 119-20 (noting that such advertisements seek merely to project a
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advertisements touting the various good works of the company (but
not mentioning its manufacture and sale of cigarettes) or the
glowing advertisements for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
emphasizing the country’s long, supportive bond and enduring
friendship with the United States (but not mentioning that fifteen
187
of the nineteen September 11th terrorists were Saudi Arabian).
As these advertisements are not selling a product, it is unlikely that
they would be considered “commercial speech” for First
Amendment purposes. But aren’t these ads selling something?
Perhaps what they are selling is inherently political and thereby
188
fully protected by the First Amendment.
189
Other companies simply sell their “brand.”
They don’t
present specific product information but, rather, a feeling about
their company, as designated by a memorable symbol, song, or
catch phrase. (Think “I’d like to teach the world to sing in perfect
harmony.” Doesn’t it make you want to reach for a Coke?) Still
other companies make implied representations about their
products in their advertising, intimating that whiter teeth (or
darker hair, or a special shampoo, or a better beer) will endow a
190
person with increased sex appeal.
All of these forms of
advertising are very different from those of 1942, when Valentine
was decided, or even from those of 1975, when the modern
commercial speech doctrine came into being. Yet, the commercial
speech doctrine has not changed to accommodate the changing
times. In an information age that moves at Mach speed, a judicial
system that purposely plods and ponders may have difficulty
keeping up with the pace of commercial evolution.

favorable impression of the sponsoring corporation).
187. Saudi Arabia spent more than $17 million on advertising and lobbying in
the United States after the attacks on September 11, 2001, of which about $16
million went toward television, radio, and print ads. According to Saudi officials,
the ads were designed to “impress upon the American people that Saudis really
are allies against terror.” Joe Carey, Since 9/11, Saudis Have Spent Millions on Image
in U.S., STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Oct. 29, 2003, at A4.
188. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 49, at 645-46 (highlighting the earlier
Philip Morris commercials discussing the importance of the Bill of Rights and
offering a free copy of the document to anyone requesting one).
189. See id. at 639-44 (discussing commercials that don’t “propose a
transaction” but merely sell brand, or tell a story; noting other commercial forms,
such as the music video and the “advertorial”).
190. See Stern, supra note 184, at 133 (dubbing this type of commercial “The
Romantic Fallacy”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/8

30

McIntyre: Nike v. Kasky: Leaving Corporate America Speechless
MCINTYRE-READY.DOC

2004]

LEAVING CORPORATE AMERICA SPEECHLESS

5/20/2004 9:38 PM

1561

3. The Public’s Right to Receive Information
In attempting to differentiate between commercial speech and
other types of speech, it has been said that commercial speech is
constitutionally valued merely as information that does not, itself,
191
form part of public discourse. If one adheres to this theory, then
the impact of commercial speech on public opinion occurs only as
192
a byproduct of the effort to sell goods. In his decision in Virginia
Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun relied on the words of Alexander
193
Meiklejohn to support this idea.
Meiklejohn argued that
constitutional protections should focus on “the rights of citizens to
receive information, rather than on the rights of speakers to
194
express themselves.” He concluded that “[w]hat is essential is not
that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
195
said.”
Commercial speech, then, may be constitutionally
protected not so much because it relates to the seller’s business,
but because it furthers “the societal interest in the ‘free flow of
196
commercial information.’ ”
This analysis begs the question of
how speech can provide information of relevance to public
197
decisionmaking without being part of public discourse, creating
yet another fuzzy doctrinal line. Nonetheless, the Court has
recognized that the consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information may be “as keen, if not keener by far, than
198
his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.” Thus, both
the ability to provide commercial information and the opportunity
to receive commercial information in a free market economy may
be as important as expression relating to political, artistic, or
199
religious matters.
Protection of corporate speech rights under the First
Amendment can therefore be seen as protecting the “public’s right
200
of access to information.” The free flow of ideas and information
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See Post, supra note 73, at 14-15.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960)).
196. Id. at 14 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
197. See id. at 15.
198. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
199. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 49, at 652.
200. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 862 n.7 (2000) (quoting Dan
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assists the public not only in political decisionmaking but in
201
A chilling
making decisions “significant to the conduct of life.”
of the process that assists such decisionmaking is harmful not only
to those providing the information, but also to the public.
In applying these ideas to the Nike case, it is clear that the
commercial speech doctrine, formed as it was from nothingness,
has struggled to keep pace with the changes in modern society
relating to information flow and economic decisionmaking. As a
result of the Nike decision—where state regulation of speech was
202
substituted for public scrutiny and counterspeech —the public
has been deprived of the information on one side of an important
public debate. The information void thus created interferes with
the consumer’s ability to make political as well as economic
“buying” decisions, thus disempowering the citizenry of its basic
First Amendment right of access to information.
VI. ANALYSIS: IMPACT ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND MEDIA REPORTING
A primary concern raised by this potential “chilling effect” on
the flow of information is that corporations may cut back or
eliminate reports and publications previously provided to the
media, corporate social responsibility (CSR) organizations, and
rating agencies. Indeed, following the California decision, Nike
decided to “restrict severely all of its communications on social
203
issues that could reach California consumers.”
Nike ceased
publishing its annual Corporate Responsibility Report.
Additionally, Nike decided not to pursue a listing in the Dow Jones
sustainability index and refused dozens of speaking invitations on
204
corporate responsibility topics.
European companies SRiMedia and CoreRatings viewed this
situation with alarm in their amicus brief filed with the U.S.
205
Supreme Court on Nike’s behalf.
The London-based

Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by
Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1233, 1245-48
(1991)).
201. Id. at 862.
202. See Fisher, supra note 15, at 29.
203. Nike, Inc., v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2568 (2003).
204. Id.
205. Brief of Amici Curiae SRiMedia and CoreRatings, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123
S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 836303 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003).
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206

companies —concerned with the potential impact on their ability
to continue providing corporate responsibility reporting to their
international community—expressed fear that potential lawsuits in
California against European companies would deter the corporate
207
transparency required to produce their reports.
The companies
asserted that the California decision operates in direct opposition
to the European Union’s movement toward increased corporate
208
social responsibility. Whereas European governments encourage
or require businesses to report on social, ethical, and
environmental issues, the California court’s decision threatens to
impose liability on any statements made in annual reports or to
209
rating agencies that are incomplete or misleading. The potential
imposition of liability in California against a foreign corporation
raises the possibility that “a European business could be punished
210
for complying with its own laws.”
211
Because CSR reporting in the United States is voluntary, the
Nike ruling creates a high level of uncertainty regarding the
continued availability of CSR data at home as well as abroad. A
main concern is that companies may decide it is better to say
nothing about their CSR practices than to risk “endless battles in
212
court.”
A further concern is that companies with poor social or
environment records will “hide behind” the California ruling, using
the decision to prevent publication of any information about their
213
practices. Indeed, there is concern that, “[f]ollowed to its logical
conclusion, the ruling would represent the end of social reporting

206. Id. at *1. SRiMedia and its affiliates are the largest publishers of
corporate social responsibility news in Europe; the company says its reports are
read by European lawmakers and corporate executives of 1200 multinational
enterprises, as well as by investment analysts of the top 275 financial institutions in
Europe. CoreRatings reports are used by leading European asset management
groups to make investment decisions; clients control in excess of $2 trillion in
investment assets worldwide. Id.
207. Id. at *2.
208. Id. at *2-3.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *2.
211. See Clarke, supra note 23.
212. See id. (quoting Elliott Schrage, Columbia University Law Professor,
former Senior Vice President of GAP, Inc., and member of the Council on Foreign
Relations).
213. See id. (noting that “[a] substantial risk has arisen out of this case that
companies will simply stonewall any efforts by CSR stakeholders for information or
heightened transparency in the CSR policies and procedures”).
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214

in America.”
Ironically, although increased corporate reporting and
enhanced transparency are high-profile goals both of the
international community and of anti-globalization activists, the
result in Nike seems to stifle such reporting and transparency. The
Nike decision provides only “short-term point scoring” through
215
penalizing behavior that should be encouraged.
By refusing to
foster open debate and a free flow of information, Nike’s
opponents appear to have acted against the very interests they
216
claimed to represent.
Concern regarding a depleted information flow as a result of
the Nike decision also extends to the media and to organized labor.
The media has expressed concern that it may not be able to
accurately report on issues of public importance regarding
corporate America if it receives information on only one side of an
217
issue.
A review of press coverage over the past several years
demonstrates a “vast array of corporate speech—on issues ranging
from race discrimination to environmental sustainability to
personal health and safety—that would now be subject to
218
California’s new strict liability dragnet.”
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) expressed similar concerns in its amicus
219
brief supporting Nike’s First Amendment rights.
Although the
AFL-CIO’s support of Nike’s position may seem to fall under the
heading of “strange bedfellows,” it is clear that organized labor
cannot debate labor practices if its opponents refuse to speak. The
AFL-CIO noted that because the majority of Nike’s manufacturing
facilities were overseas and were merely outsourced operations, the

214. Mallen Baker, Comment: Nike and Short-sighted Victories in Free Speech,
ETHICAL CORPORATION ONLINE (Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www.ethicalcorp.com/
content_print.asp?ContentID=261 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See Brief of Amici Curiae Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines,
Broadcasters, Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade
Associations, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL
835613, at *4-6 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) (“Accurate and useful reporting depends on
considering all sides of an issue . . . . [A]ttaining such a complete picture requires
newsgatherers to get information not only from interest groups and the company’s
detractors, but also from the company itself.”).
218. Id. at *1.
219. Brief of Amicus Curiae AFL-CIO, Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct 2554
(2003), (No. 02-575) 2003 WL 835038 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2003).
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labor union could not have learned the locations of the operations
220
Nike’s
without receiving the information directly from Nike.
cooperation in the sharing of information was therefore
instrumental to the union’s ability to engage in any type of debate.
The union is undoubtedly concerned, as well, about the
implications of placing limits upon Nike’s speech. If Nike’s speech
on the issue of labor practices is “commercial,” might not the
union’s speech on the same issues also be deemed “commercial”?
As the underlying debate in Nike concerned labor practices, the
ramifications of the decision, if not reversed, may ultimately have as
much impact on the speech of organized labor as on the speech of
corporations.
The effects of the Nike decision, then, are far-reaching. Labor
unions, the media, and CSR organizations alike fear the effects of
“chilled speech” that the decision may produce. The impact on
international corporate responsibility is of paramount concern, as
the potential deterrence of corporate transparency runs contrary to
the result that the international community is seeking. As one
commentator noted, “the ultimate irony is that [Nike] . . . served
only to set corporate accountability and transparency back [fifty]
221
years.”
VII. ANALYSIS: WHAT WAS THE COURT THINKING?
The U.S. Supreme Court had many options in deciding Nike—
perhaps too many. Given the growing debate concerning the
perplexing commercial speech doctrine, it may seem surprising
that the Court did not take this opportunity to clarify, change, or
even scrap the doctrine altogether. On the other hand, given the
challenge of years of stare decisis as well as the checkered
precedential value of many of its earlier commercial speech rulings,
the Court’s decision to decline the task may not seem surprising.
The Court may have been hesitant merely to issue a narrow
decision overturning Nike, understanding the larger scope of the
problem it was being asked to resolve. There is some speculation
that the Court had the votes to overturn, but could not agree on
222
the underlying doctrinal reasoning.
There is also speculation
220. Id. at *16.
221. Douglas K. Spong, Golden State Silence: High Court Non-decision Puts Chill on
Corporate Speech, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), July 21, 2003, available at http://
www.prfirms.org/resources/nike/nike072103.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).
222. See Mauro, High Court Appears Ready to Side with Nike, supra note 97 (noting
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that the Court—with its other high-profile cases absorbing so much
223
224
of its time and energy —merely ran out of time for Nike.
Whatever the reason, the Court opted to disengage itself.
In his opinion explaining the justification for dismissing the
writ, Justice Stevens intimated several underlying reasons for not
225
attempting to reach a decision. First, he indicated that the Court
did not feel a necessity for deciding the case just then, as the issues
226
Second, because of the novelty
were too novel and important.
and importance of the case, Justice Stevens felt that the correct
answer was more likely to result from a full factual record rather
227
than from mere unproven allegations. Third, Justice Stevens felt
that the matter was basically a state issue that would benefit from
228
“further development below.” Overall, the decision seemed to be
229
one of judicial efficiency, at least at the U.S. Supreme Court level.
Indeed, efficiency was ultimately served, as the case was settled.
However, justice did not seem to be served, nor was a sense of
finality provided.
Justice Stevens’s reasoning did not impress the dissenting
Justices, who were eager to resolve the First Amendment issues in
230
Nike.
They felt the case could and should have been decided by

that there may not be five votes for one rationale).
223. During this session the Court also heard three other closely watched
cases. One case involved a Texas anti-sodomy law: Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of
the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process
Clause). The other two cases concerned affirmative action: Gratz v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (holding that the manner in which the University of Michigan
considered the race of applicants in its undergraduate admissions guidelines
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003)
(holding that the narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions at the
University of Michigan Law School to further a compelling interest in obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI).
224. See Mauro, Justices Get Nike out of Their Hair, supra note 20 (noting that
chief Justice Rehnquist is “notorious” for disposing of all pending cases before the
Court adjourns for the summer, “no matter how ragged or unsatisfying the
resolution is”).
225. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2555-59 (2003).
226. Id. at 2558.
227. Id. at 2559. Indeed, Justice Stevens speculated that development of such
a record might contribute in a positive way to the public debate. Id.
228. Id. at 2559.
229. See id. at 2557.
230. See id. at 2559-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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231

the Court. Understanding that the Court’s opportunity to decide
particular issues comes only infrequently—and perhaps on this
issue, not again for years—the dissenting Justices felt a sense of
232
urgency to act. However, the Court did not seem to have the will
233
to move forward even when it had the opportunity to do so.
The ideological makeup of the Court may provide insight into
the Court’s inability to act decisively. The Justices voting to decide
the case (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer) are purported to be in
the ideological middle, with Breyer somewhat to the left of center.
The Justices who voted to dismiss were those thought to be firmly
to the right of center (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) as well as
those firmly to the left of center (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter—
though Souter is often a centrist).
Stevens, who wrote the opinion to dismiss, had been vocal in
the past regarding the danger of drawing bright lines in the
commercial speech doctrine. He often expressed concern, as in his
concurring opinion in Central Hudson, that commercial speech
should not be defined too broadly “lest speech deserving of greater
234
constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed.”
Justice
Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented in Central Hudson, noting
the substantial state and national interest in the matter of energy
235
conservation. Justice Rehnquist also expressed his view that “the
Court unlocked a Pandora’s Box when it ‘elevated’ commercial
speech to the level of traditional political speech by according it
236
First Amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy Board . . . .”
Although these opinions were rendered more than twenty
years ago, it remains of interest that Justice Stevens seemed to
reside on one end of the commercial speech continuum, favoring a
narrowing of the commercial speech definition to facilitate a
broader reading of First Amendment protections, while Justice
Rehnquist resided on the other end of the continuum, favoring a
dilution of commercial speech protection and an enhancement of
237
the states’ power to regulate speech. This divergence of opinion
231. Id. at 2569.
232. See id. at 2560.
233. See id.
234. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 579 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 599.
236. Id. at 598.
237. It is of interest that Justice Rehnquist also dissented in Bigelow, which was
reaffirmed by Central Hudson. In Bigelow, Justice Rehnquist noted that the
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on the basic underpinnings of the commercial speech doctrine may
go far in explaining why no decision was reached in Nike. Perhaps
Justices on the ideological right could not agree with those on the
ideological left, leaving those in the center to voice their frustration
over the subsequent inability of the Court to move forward.
Nonetheless, it takes only five Justices to agree, and it has been
noted that at least four Justices (Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Thomas) have seemed to be edging toward an alternative approach
where commercial speech would be protected as “a kind of public
discourse subject to regulations designed to serve specific state
238
interests in preserving ‘a fair bargaining process.’ ”
Justice
Thomas, in particular, has been widely quoted in other court
decisions and commentary as stating that it is nearly impossible to
sever commercial speech from “speech necessary to democratic
239
decisionmaking.”
For his part, Justice Breyer declared during
oral arguments in Nike that Nike’s speech was a combination of
both commercial and noncommercial speech and that Nike was
trying to contribute to an important public debate as well as to sell
240
products. He also chided Kasky’s counsel for seeming to indicate
241
that consumer protection “trumps the First Amendment.” Justice
O’Connor joined Justice Breyer in the Nike dissent, determining
that Nike should have been afforded full First Amendment
242
protection.
It would appear from the writings and recorded arguments of
the Justices, then, that there would have been at least six votes to
overturn Nike and to clarify and redefine the commercial speech
doctrine. Had the Court decided for Nike, it would likely have
opted to continue narrowing the gap between commercial and
noncommercial speech as well. But history will be silent on the
matter. Given potential changes in the makeup of the Court, as well
as the lack of viable cases to challenge the California law, it is
advertisement in question was purely commercial and therefore the state was
allowed to exercise its legitimate public interest in its regulation. See Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 832 (1975).
238. See Post, supra note 73, at 55 (referring to 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. State of
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1990) (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and
Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
239. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
240. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554
(2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 21015068 at *58 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2003).
241. Id. at *59.
242. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2565-68 (2003).
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unlikely that this Court will have another opportunity to reach a
satisfactory resolution regarding the issues raised in Nike.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The inability of the Court to reach a decision in Nike has been
the source of much frustration and concern throughout the world.
In a globally connected economy where data is transmitted
instantaneously with the click of an icon, a remarkable volume of
information is continuously available to consumers everywhere.
Once a press release or other data hits the free Web services, it
243
achieves “digital immortality.”
This means “perpetual exposure”
244
for any type of information distributed by a corporation.
The challenge for the U.S. court system is to determine how
best to protect consumers from invalid or even fraudulent speech,
while still allowing the free flow of information—commercial or
otherwise—to continue. In a world where advertising has become
245
more of an artform than a direct proposal to do business, the job
becomes much more complicated. However, the difficulty of the
task does not justify an unwillingness to undertake it. The Court
should have decided the Nike case. It should have sought judicial
efficiency not by dismissing the writ, but by making a decision. It
should have provided clarity to the muddled commercial speech
doctrine. And, most importantly, it should have provided certainty
to corporations around the world that wish to participate in the
social, political, and economic discourse of the times without fear
of endless, costly litigation in a remote state where no harm has
been alleged.
Only time will tell if the predictions of a broader “chilling” of
corporate speech will occur as a result of Nike. In the interim, the
business community faces the possibility that the government may
now use the commercial speech doctrine as a weapon to limit or
even suppress unwelcome speech. Should the Court again have an
opportunity to review the California law, it must not stumble or
hesitate; instead, it must “Just Do It!”

243.
244.
245.

See Graulich, supra note 18, at D12.
Id.
See Fisher, supra note 15, at 31.
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